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ABSTRACT 
This exploratory study is an empirical test of a model of the activities involved in hacking attacks, 
and the conditions associated with the increase in these activities. In a methodological innovation, 
the variables in the model were measured using non-reactive, secondary data obtained from sixty 
months of official statistical data, from 1999 through 2003.  These variables were analyzed using 
stepwise regression. The results obtained support several of the model predictions.  
1. Increased Broadband access by home and small business users is associated with an 
increase in Reconnaissance activities by hackers looking for vulnerable systems.  
2. Increased Reconnaissance is associated with an increase in hacking attempts to obtain 
initial access through the use of Malicious Code.  
3. The increase in User Compromise is associated with the increase in Root Compromise, 
reflecting hackers' efforts towards escalation of privilege.  
4. The negative relationship between Root Compromise and Denial of Service supports the 
prediction that hacker frustration at failing to gain control of a resource may be one of the 
factors contributing to Denial of Service attacks.  
5. Environmental variables (Broadband and Number of Hosts) are positively related to one 
another.  
These results suggest potentially significant implications for research and practice.   
Keywords: hacking, empirical test, security, network, Internet  
 I. INTRODUCTION 
Empirical research on hacking is still in its early stages, despite widespread public concern with 
network and Internet security.  Most empirical work on computer security predates the major 
growth of the World Wide Web in the mid-1990's [Bookholdt, 1989; Loch et al., 1992; Straub and 
Nance, 1990], and thus fails to take into consideration the new dimensions that the Web added to 
computing security. This exploratory study proposes a model of the activities involved in hacking 
attacks, including the impact of environmental variables such as the growth in the number of 
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Internet hosts and the increase in broadband access.  Sixty months of official statistical data 
(from 1999 through 2003) were used in the preliminary test of the model.   
Networks and the Internet are decades old, but it was the advent of the World Wide Web in the 
1990's that made them pervasive in businesses and homes. The significant growth of the Web 
led to the realization that the Internet poses an ever-increasing security threat [Straub and Welke, 
1998]. In the past, security professionals believed that most attacks on computers and networks 
came from inside the organization, but the growth of the Web turned outsiders into the biggest 
threat [Pfeegler and Pfeegler, 2002].  
The CERT Coordination Center1 registered a significant growth in computer security incidents: 
the number of incidents reported increased from 9859 in 1999 to 137,529 in 2003 [CERT/CC, 
2004]. Trends include a continual increase in the speed and sophistication of attack tools, faster 
discovery of vulnerabilities, increasing permeability of firewalls, increasingly asymmetric threat, 
and increasing threat from infrastructure attacks [CERT/CC, 2002]. A 2003 survey by the 
Computer Security Institute and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (CSI/FBI) found that 75% of 
the 530 organizations in the CSI/FBI sample detected computer security breaches leading to 
financial losses [Richardson, 2003]. In spite of the difficulties involved in measuring the costs of 
cybercrime, those costs are estimated to be substantial [Garg et al., 2003] and may grow at 
yearly rates of about 200% [Lukasik, 2000]. Given the tendency for cybercrime to be 
underreported, the magnitude of the importance of security breaches may be even greater than 
the bleak scenarios and trends already identified [Bagchi and Udo, 2003].      
Security breaches receive intense media attention (e.g., the hoopla surrounding attacks such as 
Melissa and Nimda). The trade literature offers substantial information about hacking methods, 
techniques, tools and countermeasures [McClure et al., 2001]. The academic literature on 
security breaches is mostly limited, however, to case studies about specific incidents or 
organizations [Straub and Welke, 1998] and analytical studies based on surveys of experienced 
attacks [Bagchi and Udo, 2003]. Few previous studies used actual data about security incidents 
reported to CERT/CC [Howard, 1997].   
In the sections that follow, we present a brief overview of a hacking framework (Section II), 
describe the model we developed to understand the factors that contribute to the various 
activities involved in hacking attacks (Section III), and the research questions and hypotheses 
inspired by the model (Section IV). In Section V we discuss our data collection strategy, which 
used surrogate measures based on official, publicly available statistics from the Federal 
Computer Incident Response Center (FCIRC), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 
and Netcraft.  Section VI presents an analysis of the results of the empirical test of our model. We 
conclude by discussing, in Section VII, the implications of this exploratory study for research and 
practice. 
II. HACKING FRAMEWORK 
The hacking framework presented here includes elements widely used in the development of 
practical tools for prevention and defense against hacking attacks [Bento, 2003; Howard, 1997; 
Howard and Longstaff, 1998; McClure et al., 2001; Panko, 2003; Pfleeger and Pfleeger, 2002].  
The framework identifies four steps in hacking attacks: (1) information gathering; (2) initial 
access; (3) privilege escalation; and (4) covering tracks and creating back doors.    
 
                                                     
1 Established in 1988, the CERT® Coordination Center (CERT/CC) is a center of Internet security expertise, 
located at the Software Engineering Institute, a federally funded research and development center operated 
by Carnegie Mellon University.(Source:CERT Coordination Center  http://www.cert.org/ (Current November 
29, 2004) The Center tracks computer security incidents.  
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STEP 1. INFORMATION GATHERING FOR TARGET ACQUISITION  
The information gathering activities in Step 1 can be compared to a burglar "casing the 
establishment" [McClure et al., 2001, p. 1].  They involve three main types of activities: 
footprinting, scanning, and enumeration.   
Footprinting 
The goal of footprinting is to gather as much information as possible about all aspects of the 
target and its security, just as a bank robber would try to find out about such things as armored 
car routes and delivery times, video cameras, number of tellers, escape routes,. [McClure et al., 
2001, p. 2]. Using a variety of techniques, the attacker uncovers information about the target's 
environments such as  IP addresses reachable through the Internet, TCP and UDP services, 
system architecture, access control mechanisms, remote access, and extranet.  
Scanning 
Scanning allows the attacker to focus on those systems in the target that are "alive" and actually 
reachable through the Internet, just as a burglar would try to find out which doors or windows are 
most vulnerable [McClure et al., 2001., p. 30]. Scanning involves techniques such as "ping 
sweep" (to find which IP addresses have active hosts), TCP/UDP port scanning (to find out which 
ports have active server programs running), and operating systems detection.  
Enumeration 
Enumeration refers to an intrusive probe to identify valid user accounts, network resources and 
shares not adequately protected, applications and versions, and other details. Enumeration 
activities can potentially be logged and detected, given their intrusive nature, with active 
connections to systems and directed queries.     
STEP 2. INITIAL ACCESS 
Step 2 includes attempts to gain access to the target's system, and to compromise it as much as 
possible, after obtaining user-level privileges.  
Attempts to gain access often involve malicious code, such as viruses that infect files in a single 
system, worms that spread infections across different systems (such as BubbleBoy, and I Love 
You), and blended worms or snakes, which can carry viruses and "Trojan horses" (Code Red, 
Code Red II, Sircam, Nimda). A "Trojan horse" (or "Trojan," for short) is a program that pretends 
to be legitimate software, such as a game, but "performs unintended (and often unauthorized) 
actions, or installs malicious or damaging software behind the scenes when launched." [McClure 
et al., 2001, p. 578]. Hackers may also attempt to gain access to a user's system by using 
techniques such as brute force password guessing and buffer overflows [Panko, 2003, p. 315; 
McClure et al., 2001, p. 161]. Still another approach is to gain physical access to the user's 
system (e.g., when computers are left unattended in the workplace), but this method tends to be 
a less frequent form of initial access. 
Once hackers succeed in "opening the door" to the user's computer (through malicious code, 
brute force. or physical access), they then proceed to breach its security and compromise its 
confidentiality, integrity and availability [Pfeegler and Pfeegler, 2002].  
STEP 3. ROOT COMPROMISE  
In step 3 the attacker tries to gain complete control over the system by acquiring privileges above 
the simple user-level. Control can be achieved directly or indirectly, starting with User 
Compromise and then achieving Root Compromise through escalation of privilege. The hacker 
tries to acquire administrator or root privileges (through techniques such as password cracking 
and Trojans), and to consolidate power by obtaining other accounts, and accessing other 
resources (hosts or networks).  The hacker is now in a position to wreak havoc in the system by 
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means such as reading or altering sensitive information, changing or deleting key files, wiping out 
the hard drive, and using the compromised target to launch attacks against other targets. [Panko, 
2003].  
STEP 4. COVERING TRACKS AND CREATING BACK DOORS 
In Step 4 the hacker takes advantage of the administrator-level control of the target that was 
acquired in Step 3, to try and avoid detection by the system’s own administrators.  Techniques 
include deleting or modifying logs, hiding tools, and disguising Trojans. 
The hacker may also set backdoors, to ensure that access can easily be regained later, even if 
the password is changed. Techniques include creating rogue user accounts, scheduling batch 
jobs, infecting startup files, planting remote control services, installing monitoring mechanisms 
and replacing applications with Trojans. 
STEP SEQUENCING, ALTERNATIVE PATHS AND DENIAL- OF- SERVICE  
The framework implies a logical sequence of steps: gathering information, then breaking in to 
gain user-level access, then using this level of access to gain higher level privileges, and finally 
covering the tracks and leaving backdoors open for return intrusions. It is important to note, 
however, that some steps may be skipped (e.g., gaining access without having bothered to 
gather information; or obtaining administrator privileges already in the initial access) or repeated 
(e.g., going back for more elaborate enumeration after gaining administrator privileges).   
Not all attacks succeed. When hackers are unable to achieve control of the target, they often 
express their frustration by launching Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks (such as Smurf, Fraggle 
and Syn) that disrupt services or make them inaccessible to legitimate users, networks, and 
systems. Techniques for DoS attacks may involve bandwidth consumption, resource starvation, 
taking advantage of programming flaws, and launching routing and DNS attacks.   An even more 
vicious form of attack is Distributed Denial-of-Service (DdoS), where handler programs and 
zombies or slaves are planted in several other compromised clients or servers, which are then 
used to attack the target [McClure et al., 2001, p. 504]. This form of attack succeeded in 
temporarily paralyzing big multiuser targets such as Yahoo, eBay, CNN.com, E*Trade, ZDNeT 
and others, causing severe financial losss.  
III. THE MODEL  
Figure 1 presents the model we developed to test the hacking framework. It provides a basis for 
exploring the variables inspired by the steps in the framework (reconnaissance, malicious code, 
user compromise, root compromise, denial of service). It also adds two other variables that might 
have an impact on the growth in security breaches: number of hosts in the Internet, and 
broadband access to the Internet by home and small business users.  
RECONNAISSANCE  
This variable corresponds to Step 1 in the hacking framework (information gathering for target 
acquisition, through footprinting, scanning and enumeration). The objective of reconnaissance 
activities is to identify potential victims for future hacking attacks, by obtaining information such as 
number and type of computers, operating systems, servers, applications, and resources such as 
shared files, and databases.  If the hackers find enough interesting resources in a given site or 
organization, they are then more likely to attempt initial access.  
MALICIOUS CODE 
Malicious Code is the tool of choice for hackers trying to gain initial access to user and 
administrator accounts (the beginning of Step 2 in the hacking framework). As discussed in 
Section II, Malicious Code attacks include worms, viruses, and similar computer code, and  
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Figure 1. Model for Empirical Test of Hacking Framework 
 
typically deliver Trojan horse payloads to a target's computer. Malicious Code attacks may exploit 
software vulnerabilities in popular operating systems, server software and application software, or 
rely on visit to a web site which delivers the malicious code directly. These attacks may also rely 
on users or administrators opening an e-mail attachment and/or rendering an HTML formatted 
message, which replaces a valid element type with a disguised malicious code.  A Malicious 
Code attack may also be an end in itself, intended to bring havoc and shut down a server or 
network, working similarly to a DoS attack. 
USER COMPROMISE 
This variable represents the damage to the user's system that happens in the later stages of Step 
2, after the door to a user's computer is opened through malicious code, brute force, or physical 
access. While Malicious Code is a measure of attempts to compromise computer systems, User 
Compromise is a measure of actual breaches of user computer systems.   
ROOT COMPROMISE 
Root Compromise corresponds to Step 3 in the hacking framework. Once hackers succeed at 
User Compromise, they try to gain administrator or root-level privileges (escalation of privilege), 
and to consolidate power by obtaining other accounts, and accessing other resources. Root 
Compromise may also be achieved directly, through Malicious Code that takes advantage of 
operating systems, server and application vulnerabilities, typically using buffer overflows to 
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deliver the malicious payload.  Root Compromise and Malicious Code are defined as mutually 
exclusive categories in the FCIRC data, so there is no double counting in this study.   
DENIAL OF SERVICE 
Denial-of-Service attacks (Section II) represent attempts to make a service inaccessible to 
legitimate users, as happened in the notorious attacks against Yahoo, Microsoft and others. 
When hackers are not able to achieve Root Compromise, they often express their frustration by 
launching DoS attacks, where they flood a network or disrupt connections or services [McClure et 
al., 2001; Panko, 2003; Pfleeger and Pfleeger, 2002].  The assumption here is that if hackers 
cannot achieve control of the resource, they will try to at least make it inaccessible.  
HOSTS AND BROADBAND 
Several environmental factors might contribute to the growth in security threats. Given the 
exploratory nature of this study, we consider only two such environmental variables: number of 
hosts in the Internet (Hosts) and broadband access for households and small business 
(Broadband). The increase in the number of hosts can be seen as an increase in the number of 
potential targets for hacker attacks [Pfleeger and Pfleeger, 2002]. The increase in broadband 
Internet access for households and small businesses means that there are now millions of 
computers working on 24 hours, 7 days a week, with little or no protection. Because households 
and small businesses typically lack the security protections used by large businesses, anecdotal 
evidence indicates  that the increase in broadband DSL and cable users is associated with the 
increase of malicious code attacks [McClure et al., 2001].  
IV. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES  
This exploratory study addresses two broad research questions:  
• Question 1. Which of the relationships presented in the model can be observed in practice?  
• Question 2. Are environmental variables such as number of hosts and broadband access 
associated with the hacking activities presented in the model? 
These research questions led to the formulation of the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: Reconnaissance is positively related to Broadband and Hosts   
The increase in broadband access and in the number of Internet hosts represents an increase the 
number of potential hacker targets. Faced with more targets, hackers may increase their 
information gathering activities for target acquisition (i.e., Reconnaissance). 
Hypothesis 2: Malicious Code is positively related to Reconnaissance. 
An increase in Reconnaissance activities may lead to finding a higher number of potential victims, 
which in turn may increase hacker attempts to distribute Malicious Code.  
Hypothesis 3: User Compromise is positively related to Broadband, Reconnaissance, and 
Malicious Code. 
The increase in Broadband access may represent an increase the number of users with lower 
computer security in place. This increased vulnerability may contribute to an increase in User 
Compromise. 
An increase in Reconnaissance activities may lead to the identification of more potential desirable 
targets, which may then lead to an increase in initial access and contribute to User Compromise.  
An increase in Malicious Code attacks may lead to opening doors into an increased number of 
user systems, resulting in an increase in User Compromise. 
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Hypothesis 4: Root Compromise is positively related to Hosts, Malicious Code, and User 
Compromise. 
The increase in the number of Internet Hosts represents an increase in the number of computer 
systems with administrator or root privileges, which in turn may increase the opportunities for 
Root Compromise. 
Malicious Code attacks may enable hackers to achieve administrator or root-level privileges, thus 
contributing directly to an increase in the number of successful incidents of Root Compromise.  
Malicious Code attacks may also contribute to Root Compromise through a more indirect route, 
where hackers first gain control over a user's system (User Compromise) and then, through 
privilege escalation, achieve Root Compromise.  
Hypothesis 5: Denial of Service is positively related to Hosts and Malicious Code, and 
negatively related to Root Compromise.  
The increase in the number of Internet Hosts, and the corresponding increase in the number of 
servers, may represent an increase in the opportunity for DoS attacks. 
An increase in Malicious Code may also lead to increase in DoS attacks (e.g., the SCO Denial of 
Service attack caused by MyDoom).  
When hackers achieve little or no Root Compromise, frustration may lead to an increase in the 
number of DoS attacks.  
Hypothesis 6: Broadband is positively related to Hosts.  
The growth of the Internet (reflected in the growth in Number of Hosts) can be expected to 
increase the demand and availability of broadband access.   
V. MEASUREMENT AND DATA COLLECTION  
Most studies of security breaches rely on self-reported incidents, identified through the use of 
samples and surveys. In this study, we decided to explore the possibility of using non-reactive 
measures, based on available official descriptive statistics of the whole population, rather than 
samples. We used 60 months (five years) of statistical data on incidents reported from 1999 
(when the federal government started collecting those statistics) through 2003. Given the 
exploratory nature of the study, we judged that this amount of accumulated data was large 
enough to offer insights into the methodological promise of using non-reactive data about the 
whole population. The continuing accumulation of new data over the next several years will 
generate longer historical series and allow more sophisticated analyses in the future (e.g., testing 
for the possibility of cyclical phenomena that peak at certain times of the year).  
The variables (Reconnaissance, Malicious Code, User Compromise, Root Compromise, and 
Denial of Service) were measured using the data collected for the similarly named categories in 
the statistics published by the Federal Computer Incident Response Center between 1999 and 
2003 [FCIRC, 2004].  
We found no reliable worldwide statistics for the number of Hosts in the Internet. Therefore, in this 
exploratory study, we used a surrogate measure, the number of web servers on the Internet, 
which reflects the expansion in the use of the web and access to the Internet. Our source for the 
total number of Internet servers from 1999 to 2003 was Netcraft, where this statistic is gathered 
by querying all servers in the Internet [Netcraft, 2004].  We used the total number of servers 
because we were interested in the overall expansion or growth curve, not in the relative numbers 
of different types of web servers.  
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The Broadband variable in the model was measured using data on the 60-month growth of 
broadband access for household and small businesses, which we obtained from statistics 
collected by the FCC between 1999 and 2003 [Federal Communications Commission, 2004].  
VI. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS  
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables in the model.  Reconnaissance and 
Malicious Code account for 97% of the incidents reported.  The statistics in Table 1 are 
particularly important because of their impact on such a large number of users and computers. 
Delivery of viruses to mail users by Malicious Code (as in the case of Melissa), can lead to the 
shutdown of mail servers, thus hurting not only the users who are actually infected by the viruses, 
but also all other users who can no longer access the mail server. Once a server is unavailable 
(as in the case of the Denial of Service attack at Microsoft), an incalculable number of users can 
be affected by such factors as the inability to obtain information or download latest updates and 
patches.  
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics   
Variable Mean/Month  Total % of Attacks 
Reconnaissance 19,920 1,195,186 85.74 
Malicious Code 3,272    196,335 14.08 
User compromise     16            961     .07 
Root compromise     11           633     .04 
Denial of Service      15           891     .06 
Total  incidents(*) 23,233 1,394,006  
               *Note: This total number of incidents does not include unclassified incidents 
Although User and Root Compromise are only achieved in a small percentage of all attacks, the 
results in Table 1 mean that significant security breaches still occur almost every day. As 
discussed in Sections II, III and IV, Root Compromise can be achieved directly or indirectly, 
through User Compromise and escalation of privilege. Regardless of how it is accomplished, 
each incident of Root Compromise potentially can affect a large number of computers in an 
organization, given that hackers who achieve root or administrator level privileges can then 
access most of the other computers in a local area network.  
SIMPLE CORRELATIONS 
Table 2 shows the simple correlations of all the variables in the model. The significant 
correlations appear in bold, and the letters in parentheses indicate their level of significance. 
Some high correlations were also highly significant (e.g., Broadband and Hosts), while other 
correlations were low and with low significance (e.g., Denial of Service and Hosts). 
Table 2. Simple Correlations 
 Hosts Broadband Recon-
naissance 
Malicious 
Code 
 User 
Compromise 
Root  
Compromise 
Denial of 
Service 
Hosts 1 .9022   (a) .4195   (b) .3240   (c) .1809  (e) -.0297 .1505    (e) 
Broadband .9022   (a) 1 .5135   (a) .4015  (b) .2223  (d) -.0347 .0021 
Recon-naissance .4195  (b) .5135  (a) 1 .6230  (a) .0025   .0025 -.1109 
Malicious Code .3240   (c) .4015  (b) .6230   (a) 1 .1090  -.1142 -.0432 
User Compromise .1809   .2223  (d) .0025   .1090  1 .1743  (e) -.0630  
Root  Compromise -.0297 -.0347 .0256 -.1142  .1743   (e) 1 -.2980  (e) 
Denial of Service .1505  (e) .0021 -.1109 -.0432 -.0630   -.2980  (e) 1 
(a) significant at  .0001    (b) significant at .001     (c) significant at  .01    (d) significant at .1     (e)significant at .2 
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HYPOTHESES TESTING 
Table 3 shows the results of the stepwise regression used to test the hypotheses listed in Section 
IV.  
Table 3. Results of Stepwise Regression 
 Dependent 
Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
BETA t significance R2 Hypothesis 
Support? 
H1 Reconnaissance Broadband   .513476 .00001 .26366 Partial 
H2 Malicious Code Reconnaissance   .622971 .00001 .38809 Yes 
H3 User Compromise Broadband   .222302 .0878 .04942 Partial 
H4 Root Compromise User Compromise   .174308 .1829 .03038 Partial 
H5 Denial of Service Root Compromise 
Hosts 
 -.293751 
  .141746 
.0224 
.2619 
.10886 Yes 
H6 Broadband Hosts .902162 .00001 .81390 Yes 
 
Hypothesis 1 is partially supported. Reconnaissance is positively related to the growth in 
Broadband access, and Broadband variation explains almost 30% of Reconnaissance variation. 
The association between Reconnaissance and Hosts, however, is not significant.   
Hypothesis 2 is supported. Malicious Code is positively related to the increase in 
Reconnaissance, and Reconnaissance variation explains almost 40% of Malicious Code 
variation.  
Hypothesis 3 is partially supported. User Compromise is positively related to Broadband, 
probably due to unprotected user systems in homes and small businesses. Surprisingly, User 
Compromise is not related to increase in Reconnaissance or Malicious Code. Given that only 
about 5% of User Compromise is explained by Broadband variation, it seems that other factors 
not considered in the model may have a greater influence on User Compromise (e.g. the number 
of vulnerabilities found in popular operating systems and applications). 
Hypothesis 4 is partially supported. Root Compromise is modestly associated with User 
Compromise (3%), probably through escalation from user to root privilege. Malicious Code and 
Hosts do not affect Root Compromise, however. Again, it seems that other factors not considered 
in the model may have a greater influence on Root Compromise. 
Hypothesis 5 is supported. Denial of Service is positively related to Hosts and negatively related 
to Root Compromise, as expected. Given that Root Compromise and Hosts explain only about 
10% of DoS variation, other variables that were not included in the model should contribute to 
Denial of Service.  Nevertheless, the results are still compatible with the idea that when hackers 
are frustrated in their efforts to compromise a system, they may try instead to make the resource 
inaccessible.  
Hypothesis 6 is supported. The results show a strong positive relationship between the 
environmental variables used in the model (Broadband and Hosts). More than 80% of Broadband 
variation is explained by Host variation.   
Figure 2 presents the relationships of the variables in the model, with the BETA values obtained 
for the relationships that were found to be significant.  Once more we should point out that this 
study is too exploratory in nature to allow a full causal path analysis, and therefore no causality 
should be inferred from these results. 
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Figure 2. Test of Model 
VII. CONCLUSION  
The results of this exploratory study provide preliminary support for the model inspired by the 
Hacking framework.  As expected, Broadband Internet access by home and small business users 
is positively related to Reconnaissance activities, suggesting a relationship between the number 
of vulnerable systems and the attempts of hackers to find them. Reconnaissance (Step 1) is 
positively related to Malicious Code (the preferred route to achieve initial access in Step 2), 
supporting the model's prediction that increased efforts to find vulnerable systems are associated 
with increased attempts to break into them. Success in achieving User Compromise in Step 2 is 
positively related to Root Compromise (Step 3), which is compatible with hackers' attempts 
towards escalation of privilege. The finding of a negative relationship between Root Compromise 
and Denial of Service supports the idea that a hacker's frustration at failing to gain control of a 
resource may be associated with trying to sabotage it through DoS attacks. However, it seems 
that the model still lacks other variables that might further explain User Compromise, Root 
Compromise and Denial of Service, and more research is needed to identify and test those 
missing variables.     
The exploratory nature of the study only allows for suggestive, rather than prescriptive 
implications for practice. Some practical implications, however, deserve special note. For 
example, the positive relationship between Reconnaissance and Malicious Code suggests that 
Systems Administrators should consider the detection of Reconnaissance activities as an early 
signal of future attacks using Malicious Code. This early signal should allow systems 
administrators to be prepared and take preventive measures to strengthen their defenses ahead 
of such Malicious Code attacks.   
System Administrators should also be aware of the potential risk represented by employees who 
have broadband connections at home and use them to gain remote access to the company's 
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network.  Although the relationship between the two variables was not very strong, the results 
suggest that User Compromise at home may lead to Root Compromise at work. 
Broadband Internet service providers should note the positive relationship between User 
Compromise and increase in broadband access. An important practical implication of this finding 
is that service providers should try to prevent User Compromise by creating network security 
mechanisms that compensate for the typical home user's lack of training in computer security.  
The exploratory nature of this study leaves ample room for further development and testing of the 
model. Future research should use more rigorous methods, such as causal path analysis, to test 
for causality.  Future studies should also test for serial correlations (given the historical nature of 
the data), for multi-colinearity (given a high level of correlation between the environmental 
variables used in the model), and for non-linearity in the relationships between some of the 
variables (given the ever- accelerating rate of Internet growth). 
Despite the constraints of this exploratory study, we believe that one of its significant 
contributions is the attempt to use secondary data, based on official statistics, which are non-
reactive and collected at the time of the security incidents. Most of the existing studies of security 
breaches rely on data from surveys where respondents in a sample are asked to report, 
retroactively, their experience with hacking attacks. We believe, however, that there is significant 
promise in data collection strategies such as the one used here, based on using secondary data 
obtained from publicly available sources which collect longitudinal series of statistics for the whole 
population under study.  
For example, future researchers trying to identify additional environmental variables to explain 
User and Root Compromise may find it helpful to use archives from Microsoft, RedHat, Sun, 
Symantec, and other sources.  This archival data should allow researchers to identify the 
frequency and nature of discovered vulnerabilities, and the number and security threat levels of 
the malicious codes created to exploit these vulnerabilities.  Using such industry statistics, 
researchers should then be able to expand our understanding of the relationships between 
successful Root or User Compromise and the number of computers using different operating 
systems, servers and applications.  
As government and other research and industry centers continue to collect data over the next 
several years, it should be possible to examine questions such as the possibly cyclical nature of 
hacking attacks (for example, whether they peak at certain times of the year, such as the holiday 
shopping season).  The ongoing accumulation of statistical data will make possible the analysis of 
much longer historical series and allow a deeper understanding of the phenomena in the hacking 
framework, hopefully enhancing our ability to prevent and reduce security breaches.  
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